

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Progress Report on the Activities of the IPC


- 1. On 30 July 1951, the IAC established the Interagency Clandestine Collection Priorities Committee (IPC). It has thus been in existence approximately two years.
- 2. Attached is the first formal report of the work of that Committee submitted to the IAC members for their information and comment as desired at the IAC meeting to be held on 14 July 1953.
- 3. This report is being distributed in one copy only to the members of the IAC for their personal and confidential use in keeping with the sensitive nature of the business of this Committee.

Secretary

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TOP SECRET



INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Progress Report on the Activities of the IPC

1.	The Intera	gency	Clan	destine	Collection	Prior:	ities	Commit	tee
(IPC) w	as created	on 30	July	1951 by		for	the	purpose	of:

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
- a. Determining those foreign information requirements of the U.S. Government which require collection by clandestine means.
- b. Preparing and maintaining a current listing of those clandestine collection targets deemed to have a priority status in terms of the over-all interests of the U.S. Government, and
- c. Representing the Intelligence Advisory Committee member agencies on matters pertaining to their respective interests in the field of clandestine collection of foreign information including: selection and establishment of priority standing for clandestine collection targets; diversion or concentration of clandestine collection capabilities.
- 2. In October 1951 the IPC agreed on 18 top priority targets within the entire SOVIET ORBIT. These 18 targets, 17 of which were within the USSR and one in Czechoslovakia, represented three targets for each of six agencies (Army, Navy, Air Force, State, AEC and CIA). Fundamentally, the judgment of each Agency with regard to the relative priority importance of its selected targets vis-a-vis the importance of any other Agencies' targets was not questioned. The capabilities of CS/CIA in these areas were not discussed in detail at that time except that it was realized clandestine resources were limited, the hazards great, and satisfaction of these targets should not be expected in the near future. It was agreed that the preparation of target dossiers for detailed collection planning purposes would be obtained from each requesting agency on the initiative of CS/CIA. To date, CS/CIA has gone beyond the operational planning stage into the developments of the bario of Dilles operations on four of the 17 targets. These four were requested by Army, Navy, Air and AEC. CS/CIA has indicated that it will

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proceed as rapidly with regard to the remaining targets as the improvement of its operational capabilities permit.



5. The principles referred to in paragraph 3 also apply to COMMUNIST CHINA. Targets are currently and actively being pursued in line with their criticality in respect to the wars in Korea and Indochina and their relationship to the military forces of Communist China. A consolidated listing of these targets is in the process of preparation.

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8. In order to acquaint the IPC as a body with CS/CIA's clandestine collection capabilities against priority targets in the Soviet Orbit area (except East Germany and East Austria), the Members, in the course of regular meetings held in the first quarter of 1953, were briefed on CS/CIA's operations against the targets which they had submitted. These briefings confirmed that CS/CIA's efforts are principally directed toward

targets in keeping with the priority established by
Similar briefings of the IPC will be conducted periodi-

cally.

9. The IPC is presently in the process of reviewing its Satellite targets in order to insure that they reflect the current priority needs of the member Agencies, and utilize CS/CIA's capabilities to the maximum extent. Similar reviews will also be made of targets in other areas, as appropriate.

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